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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF
LAW AND PLANNING IN THE PLANNED STATE OF BRITAIN
HERMAN FINER*

The general nature and the problems of national planning are interesting apart from any legal aspects, but I limit myself very strictly and focus
attention on the legal problems, the questions of public and private law,
principally public, that arise where a democracy, as in England, turns from
laissez-faire to quasi-socialization. 1
The first problem is the advent of this planning. How does a democratic
state proceed from a condition in which most of the economy is in the hands
of private ownership to one in which a large part of it, today, one in five of
all the working population, comes under the management, the ownership,
control of the state? Now it would be difficult in the United States under the
limitations of the Constitution, to move with the rapidity and the assurance
2
that was possible in Great Britain, where no such written constitution exists.
It has no Bill of Rights in a constitution, it has no constitutional law which is
distinguished from any other kind of law, and, because it has no written constitution with these characteristics, it has no special form of rigid amending
clause. An ordinary majority, obtained in an ordinary election, can change the
foundations of the whole of Britain's public life and that is precisely what
has occurred since July 1945. When you think that the actions of the government have included the expropriation (of course with compensation) of the
Bank of England and various credit functions, the whole transport system of
the country, including road passenger transport, trains, docks, and so on;
when you add to that fuel, like coal, and subsidiaries, the oil industry; when
you add to that all telecommunications; when you add to that also the great
utilities, electricity and gas; and add moreover the socialization of the medical
profession; when you put those together in a nationalized form you can see
that there exists nothing short of an economic revolution. In fact, no other
country has accomplished so much in so short a time within the democratic
system. The only country that has moved further, and one must say has fared
badly, is, of course, the Soviet Union whose planned economy was established
by revolution and dictatorial government of atrocious character.8
Now, in addition to these actual nationalizations, great segments of the
Britain economy are regulated strictly by the state. I may mention agriculture.
* Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.
1. Finer, British Planning and Nationalization, I.L.O. R.EEW, (March, April, 1948).
2. Cf. A.V. DicEY, LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE CONSTITUTION (1939).
3. Cf. SHORT HISTORY OF COMMUNIST PARTY (1939); A. BAYKov, DEVELOPMENT OF
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It is not nationalized in the sense that the land is taken by the government who
acts as landlord acts and leases it to tenants, or uses it itself, or organizes, as
in the Soviet Union, a collective farm system but, instead, while private proprietorship is retained nevertheless various statutes have subjected the use of
the land to standards of capable management. Those standards of capable
management being established and implemented by county boards representative of the farmers who have the immediate know-how and can say whether or
not the land is being well used. 4 Thus regulation is necessary in the interests
of the total economy because the country grows only a small part of its own
food and cannot afford to buy food from abroad in the same quantity as before,
since it cannot get the dollars from the markets of its manufactures. The
country no longer has enough money to buy its raw materials. Hence, it is
urgent that every acre should be used to the best possible capacity from the
standpoint of the whole country; this necessity implies law, in other words, a
coercion. It implies some coercion of the farmer who doesn't do a good job;
for he may cease to be a tenant if, in the opinion of his fellow farmers, he is
not doing a proper job. Someone who is a better tenant will come on that
land. This policy holds good for owner-farmer situations also.
Besides nationalization and regulation, there are great social security arrangements. These social services are of an equalitarian type: 5 food subsidies,
family allowances, 6 and so on.
Nationalization is designed to get rid of monopoly, 7 to get superior efficiency, in England by injecting into great national assets the investment,
owners in the past did not sufficiently plow back into their factories, railway
systems and mines in order to introduce advance standards of technology and
science and to increase the productivity of those instruments of production.
That is a tremendous thing to have proposed and to have completed in the
space of four years. Lawyers, trained in the obscure ingenuities of the case
books, already know that a great deal of ingenuity is required to make a law,
to interpret a law, and to violate a law; hence, we may assume that in Britain
there must have been accomplished a vast amount of brain work in establishing
the laws relating to planning. And, it is into some of these matters that I now
have to inquire.
First, let me repeat what I said at the beginning: no constitutional
obstruction to the planning of the whole of the economy exists in England.
There is no Fourteenth Amendment, there is no Fifth Amendment. There
is no need to seek amendments. The only difficulty is to persuade a majority
of the people to vote for your party and, if you become a government with a
4. Agriculture Act, 1947, 10&11 Geo. 6, c. 48.

5. Education, housing, socialized medicine, etc.
6. Family Allowances Act, 1945, 8 & 9 GEo. 6, c. 41.

7. A Commission of Inquiry before which monopolies may be called for examination
was also established in 1949.
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majority in the House of Commons, that will give you what is tantamount to
sovereign power. 8 Under British public law Parliament is supreme, which
virtually means the House of Commons is supreme. No judge can invalidate a
statute or an executive action in Britain on the grounds that it is unconstitutional providing the law is clear. Providing the intention of Parliament is put
inunmistakable language, there is not very much more for a judge to do than
to say, "In this particular controversy, this is the interpretation of the law it
is as Parliament wanted it, and there is nobody superior to Parliament to
quash that law on the grounds that a superior instrument, namely, the constitution invalidates it." 9 A tremendous power therefore rests in the hands of
the majority, but, of course, since there is such tremendous power, it behooves them to be careful in the use of it. The freedom under British conditions to go ahead and experiment is the freedom to make mistakes, and it
is also the freedom to return and amend those mistakes, because no Parliament can bind a successor. 10 Thus, the British method of planning is flexible.
The way back is open just as well as the way forward: whereas, in any other
system, dictatorial or with a rigid constitution, an amendment may be passed,
a plan may be instituted, but society might find it very difficult to get back.
Remember the great American experiment of prohibition? It was obtained
by the Eighteenth Amendment, during wartime, when the temper was propitious for providing the two-thirds majorities and three-fourths ratifications
necessary to amend but, afterwards, not until 1933 was the time so propitious
for repeal.
The British government does not have to wait for a constitutional interpretation; no British government has to fear injunctions, as in this country, to which many of the agencies in this country are constantly subjected.
The British government can train their brains and wills mainly on the specific objectives and the real substantial merits and demerits of the particular
measure at issue. However, you may appreciate that behind this process (since
we will assume that the people of Britain have a certain sobriety in their
political activities) is the fact that if the British electorate has no caution institutionalized in a written document, there is still caution in the way the
British arrive at making their laws. If you may do what you like once you are
a majority, you are influenced to be careful what you do to obtain a majority;
comparatively sober persuasion becomes a settled and expected practice.
Hence, it is interesting to ask what is the nature of the majority? What
are the problems involved in the rule of the majority principle in Britain in
this matter of planning? The first interesting thing to note is the size of the
majority, because this involves certain very important constitutional consider8.Cf. A.V. DrcEy, op. cit. Chapter one.
9. Cf. D. L. KtiR and F. H. LAwsoN, CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1-13 (1928).
10. A. V. DIcE , op. cit, Chapter One, citing Blackstone's Commentaries.
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ations. Now, the Labor Government, which has carried through this process
of planning, was elected roughly by a majority of twelve million votes against
the next nearest party, the Conservative, casting 8.7 million votes. Then there
is a Liberal Party which carries with it say another 2.24 million votes that
are not socialist, though they are not absolutely anti-socialist, nor are they
Conservatives. That totals nearly eleven million people who are not fully
socialists with most of them anti-socialists. Other smaller splinter parties
contribute a total of votes making up almost as many non-labor as labor. It
is by a narrow majority that the whole of this economic revolution has occurred.'1 This has excited controversies in Britain whether it ought not to be
considered as an accepted constitutional principle, or a convention, and not a
written rule, that no changes of this magnitude ought to be instituted by a so
simple and close majority as exists. This, again, raises the interesting question
of the immediate versus the permanent will of the people in the conduct of
constitutional innovations. The question has arisen in two forms and has been
raised by the opposition. The people with twelve million votes are never likely
to deny the validity of twelve million votes. But it certainly becomes a part of
the opposition's occupation to try to denigrate, to shake the government, and
to worry it to death urging that its authority is not as sound as it should be.
The Conservative opposition with that great parliamentarian, Mr. Churchill,
in the lead submits that if a legislature is elected for five years 12 by twelve
million votes, then in the first and second year of office, or say for two and a
half years out of five, a government might have a good substantial validity as
representing the will of the people. If necessary, the opposition must bow to
this will. Of course, the opposition will try to instruct the government, so that
the bows of opposition are not too painful to it. The first post-war elections
must be deemed to have been conducted with understanding, and debate, and
plenty of literature so that the people knew what they were doing. In the
third, fourth, and fifth years there is a kind of vaporizing of the mandate.
The opposition suggests the majority party ought to wait until the people are
again consulted, before it undertakes great reform which, though theoretically and formally reversible, are in practice very difficult to reverse. When the
government has bought the coal mines, bought out the agents, made the
miners quasi-state servants, it is very difficult to return to free enterprise. It
could be done: the coal mines could be leased just as governments lease their
rail lines or streetcar tracks. However, the actual reversal is a difficult process.
The second place in which this matter arose related to reform of the
House of Lords. 3 It is probably known to all here that England is graced by
a great anachronism, namely, the House of Lords. The House of Lords is an
11. Cf. FiNn, THEORY AND PRAcrIcE o0PMaoaN GorERMENT 552 (2d ed. 1949).
12. Parliament Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Gzo. 5, c. 13.
13. Cf. House of Commons Debates, November 10 and 11, 1947.

LAW AND PLANNING IN THE STATE OF BRITAIN

305

hereditary chamber of some seven hundred people most of whom are there
and have legislative authority by reason of the fact that they are an accident
of an accident. It sometimes occurs that the accident produces a man of great
public spirit, a man of great ability, but no private egoisms for his class. I
will not deny this; but he still, and the house still, lacks popular representative
authority. And so over the years the powers of that House which used to be
practically tantamount to those of the House of Commons have been attenuated.
In 1911, it lost the power to destroy a House of Commons' bill, but secured
the power to hold up a bill passed by the lower house for as much as two years
if the House of Commons went through a certain procedure, and passed the
bill three times within the space of two years. Then the Royal signature would
at once follow. Now the Labor Party tolerated this two year delay, but said in
their 1.945 election campaign that if the House of Lords broke the will of the
people, it would reform the House of Lords and withdraw from it this power
of obstruction. They did nothing about this until 1947. Then 14 they introduced
a bill to nationalize the iron and steel industries. The electoral mandate was
supposed to be waning. Opposition was particularly strong, as the iron and
steel industries had been producing more than ever before and at rather lower
cost. The argument of inefficiency in the industry was not very strong. It
was rather a doctrine of Socialism than a doctrine of efficiency. Therefore,
it began to be suggested by the opposition that this would be a proper occasion
for the House of Lords to interpose its veto and to embarrass the government
by amendments inacceptable to it. It would take the House of Commons a long
time to pass the bill, usually until the fifth year, which is the last year of the
Parliament. A major constitutional issue was raised in the cabinet: What are
we to do with the House of Lords? A monkey-wrench of two years for each
bill could be thrown into the legislative process and embarrass a reforming
government's whole program. The government, therefore, introduced a bill
into the House of Commons for the reform of the House of Lords cutting
down the latter's suspensive veto from two years to one. What were the arguments of the Conservative side? Some had said that the House of Lords is
the watchdog of the constitution, Opponents, like Lloyd George, had said that
the House of Lords was only the private pooch of the Conservative Party. The
Conservative Party has a vast steady, loyal majority among the aristocracy. The
Conservative leaders in the House of Commons could tip off the leaders in the
House of Lords to delay the iron and steel bill.
Of course, the Conservative Party raises the question of the constitution.
We have no written constitution, they argued, but all Englishmen have a constitution written into their minds and consciences, that violence must not be
done to the minority. This thought happens to be a well-supported idea which
14. It became a statute in December 1949. Iron & steel.
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prevails throughout the country. The Conservative Party claimed that it wished
to insure that the permanent will of the nation shall triumph over the Labor
Government's making of law by the immediate transient will of the people.
Now, nobody who loses an election can publicly admit, or will publicly say,
that he deserved to lose it, and no opposition is going to admit that the government deserved the twelve million votes they obtained. They, therefore, preferred to argue that twelve million votes were simply the transient will, and
that it is unfair to make a permanent change in the fundamental economic
structure of the country without support of the permanent will. The place of
the House of Lords in this context is simple. If the House of Lords can obstruct, it can give pause to the immediate will of the House of Commons and
the majority there, hold it up for two years, by which time another election
may be due. Thus, it can force the government to put its legislation to the
people, and to ask for a review of its authority. I presume, then, the Conservative leaders would say that if the people of Britain, to the extent of
twelve million votes, said "Yes," twice, so be it. But to say "Yes" only once
is to express only the immediate and transient will. Parliament under guidance
of the Labor Government curtailed the suspending power of the House of
Lords to one year. To be fair to everyone concerned, the government makes
its iron and steel nationalization statute law in this form: it sets the date of
its effectiveness, which in British law is called "the appointed day," on a day
subsequent to the next election. Consequently, if the Labor government doesn't
get in, they will not be there to implement the law on the appointed day, and
a Conservative government could take that same statute to Parliament and
simply have the appointed day wiped out or repeal it altogether.
Now, the whole process of legislative reform on such a scale, as the
British had between 1945 and 1950, not being inhibited by constitutional limitations, deserves a careful process of debate before a government ever gets into
the position where it can act. In fact, the whole of the program under discussion was not the invention of a single month or a year, or even five; but, in
fact, it has taken over 30 years to elaborate and to formulate itself to a point
where the ideas were almost the complete blueprint of a statute. These drafts
have been submitted from time to time to the electorate and have been debated
in various ways for over 30 years. In Britain there is a kind of instrument of
legislation or pre-legislation which I call the "social microscope." Just as a
microscope analyzes any particular part of matter in great detail, in order
that we may the better know and control cause and effect, so Britain conducts
"microscope inquiries" called Royal Commissions of Inquiry.15 They are like
Congressional investigations except that they are not as sensational. They are
not scandal-mongering; they are not intended as a hunting down of bureau15. Cf. FiNER, op. cit., 447-448.
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crats. They are sound, sober investigations with experts invoked to find the
relationship of cause and effect in social matters. Since the year 1832 there
seldom has been introduced into the House of Commons a piece of legislation of any importance without a previous great inquiry of this kind. They are
more than bi-partisan; they mingle experts with politicians. These reports,
majority and minority, are reservoirs from which the government and opposition can draw arguments. Every one of the socializing statutes mentioned
came out of such a process of inquiry. So that it was possible for the political
parties that possess research bureaus; and these political parties, which never
cease their job, do not come into operation only at campaign times, but are on
the job all the time to put out their literature transcribing the various inquiry
reports from an academic form to one which can be understood generally
by the masses of the people.
It happens that Britain is a country which has certain geographic and
geopolitical advantages in the making of law. The ideal law is one which
would be a full consensus; where people did not feel coerced; where all minds
have come together and admitted a reasonableness of principles on which all
can live together in free fellowship. Nature makes a capital contribution to such
a political fellowship where a very small compact area of government prevails,
densely populated, in which all the people can move in together and understand each other. Britain's 80,000 square miles of England can go nearly one
hundred times into the area of the United States. There is hardly a place in
England which is not reached every day, the same day, by the metropolitan
newspapers from London. They carry a heavy proportion of parliamentary
legislative news. Year after year, day after day, a widespread understanding
of political things develops. Now, this planning program was never put to
the people in all its statutory details. When you consider that the coal industry
statute consisted of around one hundred clauses with sub-clauses, written in
the way that the lawyer must write them, with a special jargon and significance
to each word, clearly, no mass population of today could read or understand
it, and dispense with lawyers and others who might explain it to them. But
the principle of it, the main drift, the idea, all this was filtered down in the
newspapers, party literature, the rest in considerable particularity, so that
in 1945 the electorate had a very good idea of what they were doing, 16 in
those respects in which the people had to make a decision as to what will be
the main advantage, as to what will be the main sacrifices that they will have
to accept, and as to what will be the broad methods by which their purposes
can be carried out. A process of this kind, honestly conducted by political
parties with a high degree of probity, admits of less need for constitutional obstruction when the parties, as men of integrity, have fulfilled the electoral task
16.
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incumbent on them, and have been returned to office; nothing can stop them.
In the absence of a written constitutional limitation, a constitutional limitation
develops within their own political understanding and character. In a sense
the populace is freer than when men are subjected to the rigidities of a
written constitution.
A vital problem arises. Is it easy to go back? In a flexible democracy we
would desire that the people should be able to go back if they find they have
made a mistake. This action is, indeed, as possible formally in the British system as going forward. The only issue is that where you have nationalized four
or five of the basic industries of the country, each one by a statute of articles
ingeniously contrived, with a new type of public financing, it would be difficult
for a Conservative Party to change the law. In fact, the Conservative Party,
recognizing, I think, the essential need and righteousness of this legislation,
17
has already said that it will not reverse the situation.
I would like to discuss the law and custom of Parliament itself. This sort
of thing cannot fail to be interesting to Americans because the first manual of
procedure of the United States House of Representatives was Thomas Jefferson's manual, and Thomas Jefferson modeled his concepts on the procedure
of the House of Commons which was the best type of legislature that the
founders of the Constitution knew. National planning involves the need for
controls over the planners. Where are we to find our chief set of controls except
in the legislative body? In private enterprise, control over efficiency is conducted by the consumer because he will not pay the price to an inefficient producer. This economic action is the theory of the matter. The inefficient
producer, who doesn't produce the things which the consumer desires, being
the described quantities at the lowest cost of production, will be beaten out
of business. This kind of control is almost abolished in the nationalized industries. Something else is needed to represent the consumer. Under the
British constitution, it is the House of Commons. Therefore, the House has
problems involved in its own position and function in what is called "the grand
inquest of the nation." Thus, the power of the House of Commons to ask
questions of ministers has been revised; special days of debate for economic
planning have been initiated; the control over what is called "executive
orders" has been reformed.
First, the British executive, designated the prime minister, does not sit
and live one mile away from the capitol at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue as in Washington. The British Parliament controls the executive by having the executive in front of it in the same seats. By a process of inference the
Parliament can guess inefficiency on his part should his tongue shy at the
full truth. The members ask some one hundred questions every day from a
17.
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quarter to three to a quarter of four, the first business of the house after
prayers. 18 Mr. Speaker always prays for the House of Commons (just as the
House of Representatives is prayed for) after which follow the hundred
questions! These inquiries consist of any questions regarding public policy.
The questions are very keen and there are supplementary questions; a very
searching, brief interrogatory of a terrifying impact. Now, the more activities
the state conducts, the more important is the question hour, because people
tend to divert their attention from the more trivial questions to those that concern the planned economy. Hence, the problem arises: supposing you allow
questions every day about the planned economy, the coal corporation, the
railroad corporation, the railroad hotels corporation, the electricity corporation
and the rest, the problem arises, are the twelve managers and the twelve
workers going to be harassed to a point whereby the responsibility of a
public answer coming every day would be so onerous that their business initiative and discretion would be paralyzed? All government officials live in a
"goldfish bowl," and if people peer in too far, seeing that the particular fish
in this bowl is not a fish but human being who loves to hide, who loves to believe or make other people believe that he is a little more noble and efficient
than he really is, will he still take business risks? Will he not cease to be an
entreproneur? Will he not prefer to go easy in order not to make mistakes? If
he is to be discredited in office by the number of mistakes, he will never get
as much credit as discredit, for where credit is deserved there will always be
a reason for withholding some of it. The process will slow down, make bureaucratic endeavor of the industries. The British government, therefore, attempted
to shield the everyday internal operations as the "business" operations of
the corporation from questions. And so the parliamentary minority appealed
to the Speaker of the House of Commons, who is the guardian of the rights of
the minority, for the right to question. As guardians of the country, they had
already advanced a doubt about the permanent validity of the mandate of the
government. Now, they asked questions about the way the mandate was used.
It is in the authority of the Speaker, unless the House otherwise directs him,
to decide the width of permissible questions. After debate he proposed to be
generous in permitting questions to be asked; but he told the minority that
whether the government answers them for you or not is another question. It
is the minority's business to question the government. The Speaker of the
House is but the impartial presiding officer. The issue is between minority and
majority.19 So if the government does not wish to answer, no doubt it will
be punished in the course of some debates, or it will be open to the minority to
go to the country and to urge that these men be not returned to office again be18. FiNni, Op. dti., 530.

19. Cf. Commons Debates, 1649. June 7, 1948.
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cause they are not frank and are not candid when asked about the management of the nation's property.
Secondly, there have been conducted on two or three occasions during the
parliamentary session three-day debates on the economic state of the nation.
In the past, the introduction of the budget, the debates on the budget, the

struggles over appropriations and ways and means have been the classic controls of the liberal democracies of the 19th century. Today, if a planned system
is to remain both efficient and legal, daily task questions are not quite enough
nor are financial debates only. A regular lengthy debate of efficiency is essential in efficiency audit. The government has instituted in the procedure of
the House two or three three-day sessions for debate of the whole economic
and social policy of the government.
Thirdly, of interest is the problem of rules and orders. Those who have
studied the public law of the United States of America know that one of its most
controversial topics today is the extent to which the executive, through the
administrative departments, is permitted in one way or the other to write
rules and orders based upon the statutes. Congress devolves, however, to an
extent determined by various Supreme Court opinions, and so determines the
extent to which discretion is vested in the departments to fill in the details of
the law.
Now, businessmen in this country have been particularly grieved by the
wide scope of such departmental legislation; for it is a discretion vested in
career officials whom it is difficult to call to account. In the United States the
executive can escape largely from Congressional control because it possesses
its own sphere of executive activity as set down in the constitution. When
the President does not want certain files to be disclosed to Congress or a Cgngressional committee, he merely orders or authorizes the Attorney General
simply to declare that tinder his responsibility to the Constitution the), cannot
have the files. 20 The Senate can do nothing about it. But all rules and orders
made under statute in Britain carrying out the work of the planning agencies
are subinissible to the House of Commons for their validity. They lie there for
thirty or forty days, and they either require an affirmative resolution of both
Houses to give them validity, or their validity may be negatived within a
certain time. 21 This means that there is more than a judicial control over the
statutory validity of rules and orders made by the executive. That exists because an action in the courts rests not on constitutional grounds (as does the
American) but on the ground that an official is doing something that the
statute does not allow him to do. In addition, there is the process of going to
Parliament to find out whether the members are satisfied that the rules or
20. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1948.
21. Cf. Third Report, House of Commons, Select Committee on Procedure, 1946,

p. X2ivff., Memorandum by the Clerk of the House.
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orders as drafted are within the main principles set down by the law. For this
process, a special committee of the House of Commons was created with the
function of watching these rules and orders by reporting to the House of Commons if it thinks that some controversial items or principle has been included,
whereupon the House of Commons, if it desires, may debate the matter and
require the government to quash or vary the order. Otherwise the order obtains validity. Here is another way of securing general popular control.
Now, I finish on the note of liberties within planning. The English are a
libertarian people. They would not coerce any minority except after most
anxious consideration and after minimizing the amount of coercion necessary
for the public welfare. In no sense by this legislation have the basic human
rights, that is to say freedom of opinion, of writing, of association, and of the
rest, been touched. The government has been most careful to secure the elements of freedom in the interstices of each statute. For example, and I take
one only, socialized medicine. Some doctors will say that the freedom of relationship between doctor and patient is abolished, and a patient might have
said he is losing his freedom of relationship with the doctor. What is the legislative answer to that? The legislative answer took about three years of negotiation with the doctors to discover, and is an ingenious permission of the
patient to go to whatever doctor he likes without explanation, to put himself
down on the doctor's list which entitles the doctor to a certain fee per year, and
to ask for his card and to walk over the road to another doctor if he becomes
dissatisfied with the doctor's care. No explanation is needed. If a patient thinks
the doctor has not given him proper treatment, he may appeal to a local body
composed of a majority of doctors, but with some laymen also, on a plea of
insufficient attention. He may have given him a cursory lookover when he
needed a thorough examination; he might not have prescribed the correct
kind of drugs; or he might have been careless in not certifying the right of
his absence from work some day; he might have been careless in not recommending the proper clinic, hospital specialist. To all of these circumstances,
there is a right substantiated for the patient under the British law. The doctor himself has one appeal after another right tip to the top institutions of the
country in order to establish his professional reputation and services if these
be challenged by a patient. The patient equally has the right to leave that doctor and above all to make a complaint against him before this public body.
These socializing statutes of some one hundred clauses each, consist of
an ingenious attempt to combine the needs of planning with a transcendent
care for the freedom of the individual.
It might have been thought that in a planned economy it would be necessary to limit the right to strike. In fact, the Labor Government did the reverse
by an act of 1947; 22 it reversed a situation which had been set up by the Con22. Trades Disputes and Trade Union Act, 1946, 9 & 10

Go. 6, c. 52.
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servatives in 1927 by setting severe limitations to the right to strike.23 No country is freer regarding the workers' right than in the planned economy of
Britain; however, this manifestation has thrown a responsibility on the
workers themselves. The workers can no longer claim that they are fighting
a capitalist-there isn't any capitalist for the miner-and the workers come to
realize that their contest is not with a capitalist, but with a government representing the entire consuming body of the country and, above all, maybe with
other occupations of their fellow workers. If a coal miner strikes for more
money and gets it, that increases the cost of the production of transport and
the transport worker has no capitalist to fight either. So we now come to see
the occupational tension in modern societies, and the result is that they have
limited their own right to strike by saying that that, for us, is antiquated. The
worker will keep the right to strike, but will exercise it with a new responsibility. The strike is a final means of pressure against maybe an irresponsive
society as a whole, or against other occupations that are organized and which
are oppressive to us. But the unions can get together in their Trade Union
Congress and work out the inter-occupational problems among themselves,
without the need of striking, and without the damage, therefore, by interruptions of work of reducing the standard of living for all.
I regret that time does not permit me to discuss certain matters in this relationship concerning the state of the law and the state of planning; but what
I have said so far, would, I think, lead you to suppose that, in the main, the rule
of law to which we all, as democratic individuals and lawyers, are devoted and
the rule of law under British planning is not only intact but beneficent.
23. Trades Dispuites & Trade Union Act, 1927, 17 & 18 GEo. 5, c. 22.

